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WHEN EVIDENCE ISN’T:  
TRIALS, DRUG COMPANIES AND THE FDA 
Drummond Rennie, M.D., F.R.C.P., M.A.C.P.*
THE EDITOR’S PRIVILEGED VANTAGE POINT 
This article is written from my viewpoint as a professor of 
medicine at a large biomedical research institution, the 
University of California San Francisco (UCSF). This point of 
view is colored by my experience as a patient and a doctor, as 
well as by a lifetime climbing in the highest mountain regions in 
the world. But what has allowed me a uniquely useful 
perspective is that for the past 30 years I have been deputy 
editor either of the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM), 
or of the Journal of the American Medical Association 
(JAMA).1
A physician-researcher is not appointed deputy editor at the 
two most prominent and largest general medical journals, both 
of which are owned by medical societies, by being a wild 
radical. In various ways I and my fellow medical editors are 
seen as representing the establishment. So consider this. 
Indirectly, the issue of money’s influence on researchers and 
physicians has over the past two decades eased the departure of 
several of the editors in chief of our major medical journals. My 
colleagues, Jerome Kassirer and Marcia Angell, both of the 
NEJM, and Richard Smith, editor of the British Medical 
* M.D., F.R.C.P., M.A.C.P. Deputy Editor, JAMA, Adj. Professor of 
Medicine, the Institute for Health Policy Studies, University of California San 
Francisco. 
1 I emphasize that I in no way express JAMA policy, nor that of its 
owners, the AMA. 
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Journal, have all, the moment that they left their posts, written 
books bemoaning the appalling influence of pharmaceutical 
company money on the morals and practices of their 
profession.2
The editor’s daily task is to examine large amounts of 
clinical research from research institutions. What has made my 
position so privileged and such an excellent vantage point is that 
these two general medical journals are magnets attracting the 
manuscripts of the best researcher-authors. Publication in one or 
the other can have an extraordinary effect on a researcher’s 
career. The research doesn’t exist until published, so a scientific 
manuscript is far more than simply letting one’s colleagues know 
new facts. Winning the fight to get published has huge social 
consequence: publication in a large general medical journal, 
rather than a small specialty journal, is a much larger coin—a 
huge silver dollar—in helping a clinical researcher along the toll 
road to academic promotion. It represents everything to an 
investigator—fame and fortune.3 So there is hot competition, 
reflected in our 5-7 percent acceptance rate, and this translates 
into that mysterious and precious commodity “prestige.” 
The fact that these two journals are the largest general 
medical journals in the world means that specialists are eager to 
try to publish their best work there, and only if they have been 
rejected at the general journals, will they then turn to a specialist 
journal. Journalists are well aware of the careful sieving that the 
NEJM and JAMA perform, so every week the major 
newspapers and media carry stories from both journals—
something our authors are keenly aware of. 
We editors try to determine the validity of clinical science, 
selecting and then improving the best 5 percent or so of the 
steady stream of 7,000 manuscripts coming in to JAMA yearly, 
2 See MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY 
DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT, (2004); JEROME KASSIRER, ON THE 
TAKE: HOW MEDICINE’S COMPLICITY WITH BIG BUSINESS CAN ENDANGER YOUR 
HEALTH (2005); Richard Smith, The Trouble With Medical Journals, ROYAL 
SOCIETY OF MEDICINE PRESS (2006). 
3 See D. Rennie, V. Yank & L. Emanuel, When Authorship Fails: A 
Proposal to Make Contributors Accountable, 278 JAMA 579, 579-85 (1997). 
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each describing clinical research, or reviewing what is known 
about a relevant clinical subject—a disease, a drug, an operation 
and so on. Publication marks the first time the work is formally 
and completely out of the research institution, to be scrutinized, 
and attempts made to test and replicate it. However, after 
publication challenges to an article’s validity and sometimes 
honesty are directed at the editors. So editors sit at the hub of 
science, and those seats can become extremely hot. 
Science is not set up like a bank checking system, on the 
assumption that fraud will be attempted. We cannot have cops, 
each presumably with a PhD, in every lab. A quicker way of 
inhibiting free thought and experimentation could not be 
devised. So we are forced to rely on trust. The editor, also a 
scientist, is part of this web of trust. 
Indeed, when there’s an allegation of, say, misconduct on 
the part of one of our authors at a research university, we 
editors are singularly helpless. We don’t have the time, 
resources, forensic expertise, mandate or authority to 
investigate, adjudicate and punish. All we can do is refer the 
complaint back to the author’s institution for formal 
investigation—and trust that the institution will follow through. 
Thus,  the whole system is built on trust. 
Trust depends on there being someone accountable. This is 
why Joshua Lederberg, the Nobel Laureate who was president 
of Rockefeller University, wrote, “Above all, the act of 
publication is an inscription under oath, a testimony.”4 That is 
how I was taught science should operate and assumed it did 
until, in 1977, I became deputy editor of the NEJM.  I soon 
learned from repeated, bitter personal experience that, when 
scientists had a great deal at stake, some were prepared, in the 
name of prestige, to take short cuts, falsify, fabricate, 
plagiarize, bamboozle, lie, cheat, and throw away their 
reputations simply to notch up more publications, advance their 
careers and, of course, make more money. 
4 J. Lederberg, 7 THE SCIENTIST 10, 10-14 (1993). 
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I.  RESEARCH MISCONDUCT 
By chance, I became a medical editor just at the time when 
instances of scientific “fraud” were hitting the newspapers, and 
engaging academics in furious debate. Several flamboyant cases 
of fabricating scientists, some from important research 
institutions such as Harvard and Yale, publishing fabricated 
work in my journal and in others, occurred during the decade 
between 1979 and 1989. The scientific establishment professed 
shock and denial in equal amounts. To an editor like myself, it 
was clear that the problem was real and on-going.5
Eventually, scientists were forced to face reality by 
politicians, starting with then-Congressman Al Gore, and 
considerably assisted by the benign influence of wise individuals 
from the American Bar Association, whose everyday job was to 
confront and deal with fraud of every sort, and who were far 
less prone than my colleagues to believe that scientific degrees 
bestowed such attributes as honesty. In 1989 federal regulations 
were put in place that defined scientific misconduct, and set out 
a framework and process whereby allegations were to be 
handled and adjudicated by all research institutions. While these 
regulations were modified as cases occurred during the decade 
of the 1990s, handling of such cases became routine and the 
frenetic atmosphere surrounding such betrayals of their 
profession by scientists, and especially physician-scientists, 
calmed down. 
Thus, when Eric Poehlman was recently sentenced to a year 
in prison because he included the results of his numerous 
falsified and fabricated reports in grant applications for NIH 
money, scant notice was paid by the media.6 This did not meant 
not that the problem of gross fraud had gone away, but that we, 
the profession and the public had learned that a certain small 
5 See D. Rennie & C.K. Gunsalus, Scientific Misconduct: New 
Definition, Procedures, and Office—Perhaps a New Leaf, 269 JAMA 915, 
915-91 (1993). 
6 H.C. Sox & D. Rennie, Research Misconduct, Retraction and 
Cleansing the Medical Literature: Lessons from the Poehlman Case, 144 
ANN. INTERN. MED. 609, 609-13 (2006). 
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proportion of scientist/physicians will turn out to be crooks. . 
No great surprise to lawyers, but apparently a revelation to 
scientists. 
II.  BIASED REPORTING OF RESULTS: DELIBERATE OR 
UNCONSCIOUS 
After a year or so as an editor, it became obvious to me that 
such rare cases, the chainsaw massacres of science, were not the 
main problem. My eyes were first opened in 1978 at the NEJM 
when we published an article describing a break-through in 
developing a blood test to detect chronic paranoid 
schizophrenia.7 We were astonished, embarrassed and then 
angry to be told that on the day we had published our article 
another had appeared in the American Journal of Psychiatry. In 
the American Journal of Psychiatry’s article the authors showed 
the complete absence of this marker in chronic paranoid 
schizophrenics.8  What upset us was that two of the authors 
appeared on the byline of both articles. When challenged, they 
disingenuously claimed that it was not their custom to refer to 
unpublished work in a publication, showing that to them 
authorship of a scientific article had meaning only in so far as it 
brought credit in the form of another publication. The other side 
of credit, responsibility, simply did not exist. 
Authors would sign our forms testifying that they there was 
no substantive overlap between the manuscript they had sent us 
and any other paper they had in the works, yet happily publish 
almost identical articles in other journals. They would attest to a 
complete absence of financial conflicts of interest, but at the 
same time fail to tell us, for example, of relevant patents that 
they held, or that they had appeared as paid expert witnesses on 
the subject on dozens of occasions. Numerous other incidents of 
7 See S.G. Potkin, H.E. Cannon, D.L. Murphy & R.J. Wyatt, Are 
Paranoid Schizophrenics Biologically Different from other Schizophrenics?, 
298 N. ENGL. J. MED  61, 61-66 (1978) . 
8 P.A. Berger, R.A. Ginsburg, J.D. Barchas, D.L. Murphy & R.J. 
Wyatt, Platelet Monoamine Oxidase in Chronic Schizophrenic Patients, 135 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 95, 95-99 (1978). 
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failure to accept accountability in the race for promotion, which, 
had I not been an editor, I would never have known about, 
made me increasingly skeptical. 
III.  MONEY 
For clinical science, and so for us editors, everything 
changed with the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980.9 This 
Act allowed universities, for example, to retain intellectual 
property control of their inventions made while conducting 
federally funded research. The Act smoothed the process 
whereby researchers working on government contracts or grants 
could, with their institutions, share in the action, and profit from 
their discoveries. This had the desired effect: a massive influx of 
venture capital into universities, and a stimulus to researchers, a 
few of whom became rich, and it probably shortened the gap 
between bench and bed-side for some new drugs. 
However, a predictable consequence of this huge influx of 
money was to compete for the interest of the researchers. 
Researchers became more secretive, less willing to share, and  
the sponsorship of clinical studies became a crucial issue.10 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, I never once was 
involved in an editorial discussion about funding and conflicts of 
interest. In contrast, nowadays it would be very rare at the twice 
weekly JAMA manuscript selection meetings for the subject not 
9 Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Act (codified as 35 
U.S.C. §§ 200-212; implemented by 37 C.F.R. 401(1980)). 
10 See J.E. Bekelman, Y. Li & C.P. Gross, Scope and Impact of 
Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 
289 JAMA 454, 454-65 (2003); J. Lexchin, L.A. Bero, B. Djulbegovic, & 
O. Clark, Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship and Research Outcome and 
Quality: Systematic Review, 326 BMJ 1167, 1167-70 (2003); B. Als-Nielsen, 
W. Chen, C. Gluud & L.L. Kjaergard, Association of Funding and 
Conclusions in Randomized Drug Trials: A Reflection of Treatment Effect or 
Adverse Events, 290 JAMA 921, 921-28 (2003); L.A. Bero, A. Galbraith & 
D. Rennie, The Publication of Sponsored Symposiums in Medical Journals, 
327 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1135, 1135-40 (1992); N.K. Choudhry, H.T. Stelfox 
& A.S. Detksy, Relationships Between Authors of Clinical Practice 
Guidelines and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 287 JAMA 612, 612-17 (2002). 
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to come up, our skepticism often taking this sort of form: “It 
seems like a good paper. Can we believe a word of it?” Are the 
authors so influenced by the money they receive from their 
commercial sponsors that they either deliberately distort the 
evidence, or are unconsciously biased to do so? 
IV.  THE EVIDENCE THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS BAD 
We editors are clinical investigators, and we are used to 
weighing scientific evidence. So what is the evidence that 
indicates that scientific evidence is suspect? 
In the 1980s, faced by the challenge of trying to make sense 
of, and boil down, the massive and rapidly increasing literature 
on the effect of “interventions”—of drugs, surgery and other 
therapies—the science of meta-analysis was developed. Meta-
analysis is a rigorous technique whereby all the literature 
concerning a particular drug could, using new methods of 
searching, be identified, and studied for relevance and quality. 
Then, after considerable winnowing, the efficacy of the drug in 
all comparable high quality trials, could be worked out. Meta-
analysis began to be applied on a large scale, and as, for the 
first time, rational and systematic ways to sort the wheat from 
the chaff, so for the first time all sorts of problems with the 
literature began to emerge. 
First, it was found that companies were paying physician 
scientists to publish the same results of the same trials in 
different journals, under different authors’ names, with no cross-
referencing. Since they were also paying scientists to publish 
only the positive results, and bury the negative ones, this 
systematic obfuscation had the effect of creating artificial 
scientific support for a drug, both before regulatory agencies, 
and, of course, to impress the prescribing physician.11
11 See, e.g., P.C. Gøtzsche, Multiple Publication of Reports of Drug 
Trials, 36 EUR. J. CLIN. PHARMACOL. 429, 429-32 (1989). See also P. 
Huston & D. Moher, Redundancy, Disaggregation, and the Integrity of 
Medical Research, 347 LANCET 1024, 1024-26 (1996); M.R. Tramer, 
D.J.M. Reynolds, R.A. Moore & H.J.  McQuay, Impact of Covert Duplicate 
Publication on Meta-Analysis: A Case Study, 315 BMJ 635, 635-40 (1997). 
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It was then found that some physician had so far forgotten 
their professional ethics that, again at the behest of their 
sponsors, they were getting the results their sponsors wanted in 
drug trials by hobbling the other horse in the race, the 
competitor’s drug, which in the trials was administered in the 
wrong dose by the wrong route.12
Meanwhile, it became apparent that many trials, though 
ostensibly coming from impartial and prestigious research 
universities, were actually set up, designed, conducted, and the 
data analyzed by the companies themselves, or their dependent 
subcontractors who wrote the reports of the trials.13 These were 
the manuscripts that we editors received in good faith, only to 
discover, sometimes years later, that the “authors” had been 
anointed as such when everything but the final draft of the 
manuscript had been completed by the company, their sole 
function being to lend their scientific and institutional prestige to 
the trials, and make them credible to the profession.14
Ethical investigators, outraged by what was happening, 
began sending me letters that they had received from firms 
acting for drug manufacturers offering them tens of thousands of 
dollars simply to add their own names to reviews of a drug’s 
efficacy—reviews they had never seen before and which were 
always favorable to the new drug15.  Meanwhile sponsoring 
companies threatened the researchers to prevent them from 
12 H.K. Johansen & P.C. Gøtzsche, Problems in the Design and 
Reporting of Trials of Antifungal Agents Encountered During Meta-Analysis, 
282 JAMA 1752, 1752-59 (1999); D. Rennie, Fair Conduct and Fair 
Reporting of Clinical Trials, 282 JAMA 1766, 1766-68 (1999). 
13 See R. Winslow, Drug Company’s PR Firm Made Offer to Pay for 
Editorial, Professor Says, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1994, at B-12; D. Rennie & 
A. Flanagin, Authorship! Authorship! Guests, Ghosts, Grafters, and the Two-
Sided Coin, 271 JAMA 469, 469-71 (1994); T. Hornbein, L. Bero & D. 
Rennie, The Publication of Commercially Supported Supplements Statement, 
81 ANESTH. ANALG. 887, 887-88 (1995). 
14 See L.A. Bero & D. Rennie, Influences on the Quality of Published 
Drug Studies, 12 INT. J. TECHNOL. ASSESS. HEALTH CARE 209, 209-37 
(1996). 
15 T. Brennan, Buying Editorials, 331 N. ENGL. J. MED. 673, 675 
(1994). 
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publishing unfavorable results.16
Soon scientists began to investigate the phenomenon. In 
every one of the many scores of such studies of published trials, 
an overwhelming bias was found in favor of the sponsors’ 
drugs, a bias that was not present when the trials were 
performed by investigators free of commercial funding. 
When my colleagues and I recently studied reviews drugs 
used in a widespread, serious and treatable condition, 
hypertension, we found that, on the basis of the same data, the 
reviews sponsored by manufacturers placed a far more positive 
spin on the data than did independent reviews.17 Recently, the 
situation reached its worst when some scientists published a 
paper that showed that in numerous head-to-head comparisons, 
drug A was better than drug B; drug B better than drug C; and 
drug C better than drug A.18 The only factor that explained this 
was the funding of the various trials. 
V.  THE $2,000 ASPIRIN 
Just how widespread this distortion of the evidence has 
become was illustrated starkly in the case of two classes of drug, 
the new pain-relievers, the COX-2 inhibitors, and the psycho-
active drugs used in depression, the SSRIs. 
The COX-2s inhibit an enzyme associated with 
inflammation, and there was reason to think that they would be 
16 D. Rennie, Thyroid Storm, 277 JAMA 1238, 1243 (1997); J.O. Kahn, 
D.W. Gherng, K. Mayer, H. Murray & S. Lagakos, Evaluation of HIV-1 
Immunogen, An Immunologic Modifier, Administered to Patients Infected with 
HIV Having 300 to 549 106/L CD4 Cell Counts, 284 JAMA 2193, 2193-02 
(2000); D.G. Nathan & D.J. Weatherall, Academic Freedom in Clinical 
Research, 347 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1368, 1638-71 (2002). 
17 V.A. Yank, D. Rennie & L.A. Bero, Financial Ties and Concordance 
Between Results and Conclusions in Meta-Analyses (forthcoming 2007 in 
BMJ). 
18 S. Heres, J. Davis, K. Maino, E. Jetzinger, W. Kissling & S. Leucht, 
Why Olanzapine Beats Risperidone, Risperidone Beats Quetiapine, and 
Quetiapine Beats Olanzapine: An Exploratory Analysis of Head-to-Head 
Comparison Studies of Second-Generation Antipsychotics, 163 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 185, 185-94 (2006). 
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better than aspirin and all the others pain-relievers, and, being 
extremely expensive, would make billions for the manufacturers. 
A key claim made by the manufacturers to persuade physicians 
to prescribe these expensive new drugs was that these COX-2s 
caused less inflammation and bleeding in the stomach than the 
standard drugs. At the same time, since the enzyme that was 
inhibited tended to decrease clotting mechanisms in blood 
vessels, the makers needed to show that the COX-2s did not 
increase the risk of blood clots and heart attacks. 
The big trials, done at the behest of the manufacturers, that 
showed these crucial findings were all published in prominent 
medical journals: one in JAMA19 two in the NEJM20 and one in 
the Annals of Internal Medicine.21 Over the next few years, and 
partly because of lawsuits, it became clear that in every case the 
authors either could not take full responsibility for their trials, or 
there were distortions of the evidence that seriously weakened 
19 F.E. Silverstein et al., Gastrointestinal Toxicity with Celecoxib vs 
Nonsteroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs for Osteoarthritis and Rheumatoid 
Arthritis: The CLASS Study: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 284 JAMA 
1247, 1247-55 (2000). See also J.B. Hrachovec, Reporting of 6-month vs 12-
month Data in a Clinical Trial of Celecoxib, 286 JAMA 2398 (2001); J.M. 
Wright, T.L. Perry, K.L Bassett & G.K. Chambers, Reporting of 6-month vs 
12-month Data in a Clinical Trial of Celecoxib, 286 JAMA 2398 (2001). 
20 C. Bombardier et al., VIGOR Study Group: Comparison of Upper 
Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with 
Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343(21) N. ENGL. J. MED. 1520, 1528 (Nov. 23, 
2000). See also R.S. Bresalier et al., Adenomatous Polyp Prevention on 
Vioxx (APPROVe) Trial Investigators: Cardiovascular Events Associated with 
Rofecoxib in a Colorectal Adenoma Chemoprevention Trial, 352 N. ENGL. J. 
MED.1092, 1102 (2005), Epub Feb. 15, 2005, Erratum in 355(2) N. ENGL. J. 
MED. 221 (Jul. 13, 2006); S.W. Lagakos, Time-to-Event Analyses for Long-
Term Treatments: the APPROVe Trial, 355 N. ENGL. J. MED. 113, 117 
(2006); Merck and Co Inc., News Release, Merck Corrects Description of a 
Statistical Method Used in APPROVe StudyMay 30, 2006, available at 
http://www.merck.com/newsroom/press_releases/corporate/2006_0530.html 
(last visited Aug. 6, 2006). 
21 J.R. Lisse et al., ADVANTAGE Study Group, Gastrointestinal 
Tolerability and Effectiveness of Rofecoxib Versus Naproxen in the Treatment 
of Osteoarthritis: A Randomized, Controlled Trial, 139(7) Ann. Intern. Med. 
539, 529-46 (Oct. 7, 2003). 
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the conclusions of the trials that such drugs did not cause 
cardiovascular disease.22 The stock of Merck, the makers of 
Vioxx, lost $29 billion in one night when they withdrew it from 
the market because of its effects on the heart.23 I believe that, 
had the results been presented in a forthright manner from the 
start, Vioxx might still be on the market. 
VI.  PUBLICATION BIAS AND TRIAL REGISTRATION 
When the selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors (SSRIs) 
were introduced, they were thought to herald a new dawn in the 
treatment of disorders of mood, including depression. The 
parents of children who had been prescribed these drugs, 
arguing that the SSRIs had precipitated the suicides, sued the 
makers, and the discovery process revealed the existence of 
unpublished trials, with far less favorable results from those that 
had appeared in the medical journals, as well as instances of 
suicide in children given SSRIs. It is well-known that at the time 
when a child’s depression is so bad that he or she has to be 
taken to see a physician, suicide is a real possibility, so there is 
legitimate scientific debate on the issue of whether these drugs 
increase that likelihood. 
The tendency of “positive” trials to be written up, sent to 
journals and published before “negative” trials, is called 
“publication bias”—bias, because only one side is ever known to 
physicians and their patients. It has emerged as a massive 
distortion of the clinical evidence because the makers are the 
biggest sponsors of trials and they rarely publish the negative 
22 P. Jüni, A.W.S. Rutjes & P.A. Dieppe, Are Selective COX 2 
Inhibitors Superior to Traditional Non Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs?, 
324 BMJ 1287, 1288 (2002); D.J. Graham, Cox-2 Inhibitors, Other NSAIDs, 
and Cardiovascular Risk: The Seduction of Common Sense, 296 JAMA 1653, 
1656 (2006). 
23 Merck and Co Inc., News Release, Merck Announces Voluntary 
Worldwide Withdrawal of Vioxx, Sept. 30, 2006, available at 
http://www.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx/pdf/vioxx_press_release_final.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 4, 2006). 
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results.24 A good preventive strategy is to register all trials at 
inception, so that anyone reviewing the evidence can know about 
unpublished trials, and get the results, or, if they are withheld, 
draw their own conclusions.25 Representatives of the industry 
refused to agree to this in 2000, claiming that the very existence 
of trials was a trade secret, a position which I, as a physician, a 
researcher, and, above all, as a patient and an experimental 
subject in clinical trials, regard as entirely unethical.26
However, on June 2, 2004 Eliot Spitzer, then the attorney 
general for the State of New York, recognizing that no one 
knew whether or not SSRIs increased the risk of suicide, but 
aware that failure to reveal the existence of trials was at the very 
least unfair to the parents and patients, sued a large 
manufacturer, GSK, to reveal the existence of such trials. I have 
summarized the events that have followed, in brief, as part of a 
settlement, the company agreed to register all trials publicly.27
Within a few days, several other drug companies agreed to 
comply and on August 26, 2004, Spitzer announced a settlement 
whereby GSK committed to putting summaries of the results of 
all GSK-sponsored clinical trials of drugs into a clinical trials 
register, posted on the Internet and conspicuously identified on 
the home page of the GSK website.28
24 K. Dickersin, S. Chan, T.C. Chalmers, H.S. Sacks & H.J.R. Smith, 
Publication Bias and Clinical Trials, 8 CONTROLLED CLIN. TRIALS 343, 353 
(1987). See also P.J. Easterbrook, J.A. Berlin, R. Gopalan & D.R. 
Matthews, Publication Bias in Clinical Research, 337 LANCET 867, 867-72 
(1991); K. Dickersin, The Existence of Publication Bias and Risk Factors for 
its Occurrence, 263 JAMA 1385, 1385-89 (1990); K. Dickersin, R. Scherer 
& C. Lefebvre, Identifying Relevant Studies for Systematic Reviews, 309 BMJ 
1286, 1286-91 (1994). 
25 K. Dickersin, Why Register Clinical Trials? Revisited, 13 CONTROL 
CLIN. TRIALS, 170, 177 (1992); K. Dickersin & D. Rennie, Registering 
Clinical Trials, 290 JAMA 516, 516-23 (2003). 
26 I. Chalmers, Underreporting Research is Scientific Misconduct, 263 
JAMA 1405, 1408 (1990). 
27 D. Rennie, Trial Registration—A Great Idea Switches from Ignored to 
Irresistible, 292 JAMA 1359, 1259-362 (2004). 
28 Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Press 
Release, Settlement Sets New Standard for Release of Drug Information, 
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Using the blunt instrument of the law, Spitzer accomplished 
in a month what I and my colleagues had failed to do over more 
than two decades. Meanwhile, the International Committee of 
Medical Journal Editors announced that, for the journals they 
represented, trials would have to be registered before they could 
be considered for publication.29 Though there have been 
numerous attempts by manufacturers to subvert trial registration, 
while at the same time seeming to comply, (trials are registered 
as being of “an investigational drug,” for example), the system 
now seems to be beginning to work reasonably well. 
VII.  WHERE IS THE FDA IN ALL OF THIS? 
A function of the FDA is to guard the health of the public, 
so it is striking to discover that the FDA was entirely absent 
from the debate over trial registration, even though that bears 
directly on information available to patients and their physicians. 
In like manner, it is reasonable to ask why the FDA did not 
correct what appeared in the journals when results were 
published that directly conflicted with what the FDA knew to be 
the true facts. The FDA had the facts, provided under law by 
the manufacturers, since a drug’s approval is contingent on such 
provision, but claimed they have no mandate actually to inform 
the public. 
Just as Bayh-Dole in 1980 changed the culture of clinical 
research, and the relationships between sponsors, researchers 
and journals, so changes in the law have affected the FDA’s 
relationships. The Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) 
was passed in 1992,30 and revised in 1997 and 2002. The object 
of PDUFA was to speed up the approval process for drugs, and 
it provided the means to do this by mandating user-fees. 
Manufacturers had to pay towards the costs of the approval 
Aug. 26, 2004, available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/aug/ 
aug26a_04.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2004). 
29 Clinical Trial Registration: A Statement from the International 
Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 292 JAMA 1363 (2004). 
30 The Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA I), Public Law 102-
571, Oct. 29, 1992. The Act is currently up again before the Congress. 
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process. The Act was effective in cutting down the time to 
approval.31 In the process, the PDUFA changed the entire 
culture at the FDA as well as its relationships with the 
pharmaceutical companies and the American people. The FDA 
used to have one client: the American people. The fact that the 
companies it regulates pay user-fees for the service has meant 
that the only clients on the FDA’s case are drug company 
representatives. This is so even though the speeded up process 
results in profits that vastly exceed the fees, and even though the 
actual contribution of industry to the finances of the FDA is a 
fraction of that provided by public monies. The FDA now 
behaves as if the manufacturers are the only clients worth 
serving. 
A telling example of this behavior, and illustration of this 
relationship, has just been described by Ross.32 The FDA knew 
that numerous severe violations (four referred for criminal 
investigations) had occurred in the trial performed by the maker 
of the antibiotic ketec. Indeed, the FDA’s own criminal 
investigators had recommended examining the manufacturers to 
determine whether there had been systematic fraud—an 
examination that the FDA never followed through by doing. At 
the very least, these facts put the integrity of the whole database 
into question. Yet the data were, despite this, still presented to 
the experts for ketec’s approval, and those experts voted for its 
approval without knowing that the data were highly suspect. 
Subsequently, the FDA helped to retain the drug’s approval 
rating by allowing foreign data on safety to be considered 
despite the known unreliability of such data. 
In the case of medical devices, the FDA is even more 
company-friendly. A review on a device to ease severe 
depression had already become a poster child for what is wrong 
with medical publishing. The academics who appeared as 
authors of the definitive review on the effectiveness of a vagal 
31 The Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug 
Administration, Prescription Drug User Fee Act, Public Meeting, 72 Federal 
Register 1743-53 (Jan. 16, 2007). 
32 D.B. Ross, The FDA and the Case of Ketek, 356 N. ENGL. J. MED. 
1601, 1604 (2007). 
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nerve stimulating (VNS) device were later all revealed to have 
close financial ties with the makers, none of which were 
mentioned in the article.33 The review was actually ghost-written 
by an individual employed by the makers. Finally, the first 
“author” on the by-line was the editor of the journal that 
published it. 
The approval process for the device was handled by the 
FDA in an even more extraordinary fashion,34 the approval 
being granted, as Senator Charles Grassley, ranking republican 
on the Senate Finance Committee, noted: 
based upon a senior manager overruling more than 20 
Food and Drug Administration scientists, medical, 
and safety officers, as well as managers, who 
reviewed the data on VNS. The high-level official 
approved the device despite a resolute conclusion by 
many at the FDA that the device did not demonstrate 
a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness.35
The FDA chooses not to exercise the powers it possesses. 
Given that it has the power to force a manufacturer to withdraw 
a drug from the market, this timid approach is astonishing, and, 
of course, directly harms patients. In addition, the FDA grants 
waivers to advisory committee members with disabling conflicts 
of interest since they are paid by a drug’s makers to decide 
about the approval of the maker’s drugs.36 Add to that the fact 
that the FDA fails to tell the public, let alone the journals, when 
the agency possesses data that show authors are distorting the 
evidence; and that the FDA is complicit with companies in 
33 C.B. Nemeroff et al., VNS Therapy in Treatment-Resistant 
Depression: Clinical Evidence and Putative Neurobiological Mechanisms, 31 
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 1345, 1355 (2006), Epub Review Apr. 19, 
2006, Erratum in 31 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 2329 (2006). 
34 M. Schuchman, Approving the Vagus-Nerve Stimulator for 
Depression, 356 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1604, 1607 (2007). 
35 U.S. Senate Committee on Finance. Review of the FDA’s approval 
process for the Vagus Nerve Stimulation Therapy System for treatment-
resistant depression, S. 1388-1389 (Feb. 16, 2006). 
36 D. Cauchon, FDA Advisers Tied to Industry, USA TODAY, Sept. 25, 
2000. 
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hiding trials and so in worsening publication bias. All in all, the 
FDA presents a classic picture of an agency captured by those it 
regulates.37 The failure of a politically spineless FDA to regulate 
is especially unfortunate at a time when editors, the profession 
and the public are losing confidence in the integrity of the trials 
required by the FDA and needed by the profession and public. 
VIII.  POST-MARKETING SURVEILLANCE 
Nothing illustrates the problem with the FDA’s pro-industry, 
anti-public health stance better than post-marketing surveillance 
—the single most important function for any rational system for 
protecting the public against the dangers of harmful drugs. 
Though it has for ten years been mandatory to register trials 
having to do with HIV infection and cancer (the only conditions 
regarded as “life threatening”) drug companies routinely ignored 
the law and were never punished by the regulators.38 The FDA 
does not enforce requirements that companies perform the post-
marketing studies on which their approval is conditioned; it puts 
post-marketing surveillance in the hands of those with the least 
incentive to find problems—those who handled pre-marketing 
approval; and the FDA has reduced surveillance to a very small 
group with little standing and prestige. 
IX.  WHAT IS A TRIAL? 
The approval process starts with evidence gleaned from 
clinical trials. It might be instructive to compare the sort of 
37 See generally D. Henry & J. Lexchin, The Pharmaceutical Industry as 
a Medicines Provider, 360 LANCET 1590, 1595 (2002); J. Collier & I. 
Iheanacho, The Pharmaceutical Industry as an Informant, 360 LANCET 1404, 
1409 (2002). See also J. Abraham, The Pharmaceutical Industry as a 
Political Player, 360 LANCET 1498, 1498-502 (2002); M. Angell, Taking 
Back the FDA, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 26, 2007; R. Moynihan, Alosetron: A 
Case Study in Regulatory Capture, or a Victory for Patients’ Rights?, 325 
BMJ 592, 592-95 (2002). 
38 E. Manheimer & D. Anderson, Survey of Public Information About 
Ongoing Clinical Trials Funded by Industry: Evaluation of Completeness and 
Accessibility, 325 BMJ 528, 531 (2002). 
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trials with which clinical researchers are familiar with those that 
go on in the courts. It seems to me fundamental that the legal 
trial carries credibility and retains force and respect with the 
public because the various parties, judge, jury, opposing 
counsels, witnesses and police, are independent one from 
another. 
A clinical trial can be different. In that process, it is very 
much in the interest of the drug’s sponsor, or manufacturer, to 
make everyone in the process its dependent, fostering as many 
conflicts of interest as possible. Before the approval process, the 
sponsor sets up the clinical trial—the drug selected, and the dose 
and route of administration of the comparison drug (or placebo). 
Since the trial is designed to have one outcome, is it surprising 
that the comparison drug may be hobbled—given in the wrong 
dose, by the wrong method? The sponsor pays those who collect 
the evidence, doctors, and nurses, so is it surprising that in a 
dozen ways they influence results? All the results flow in to the 
sponsor, who analyses the evidence, drops what is inconvenient, 
and keeps it all secret—even from the trial physicians.39 The 
manufacturer deals out to the FDA bits of evidence, and pays 
the FDA (the judge) to keep it secret. Panels (the jury), usually 
paid consultant fees by the sponsors, decide on FDA approval, 
often lobbied for by paid grass-roots patients organizations who 
pack the court (that trick is called “astro-turfing”). If the trial, 
under these conditions, shows the drug works, the sponsors pay 
subcontractors to write up the research and impart whatever spin 
they may; they pay “distinguished” academics to add their 
names as “authors” to give the enterprise credibility, and often 
publish in journals dependent on the sponsors for their existence. 
If the drug seems no good or harmful, the trial is buried and 
everyone reminded of their confidentiality agreements. Unless 
the trial is set up in this way, the sponsor will refuse to back the 
trial, but even if it is set up as they wish, those same sponsors 
may suddenly walk away from it, leaving patients and their 
39 A.W. Chan, A. Hrobjartsson, M.T. Haahr, P.C. Gøtzsche & 
D.G.Altman, Empirical Evidence for Selective Reporting of Outcomes in 
Randomized Trials: Comparison of Protocols to Published Articles, 291 
JAMA 2457, 2465 (2004). 
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physicians high and dry.40
In short, we have a system where defendant, developers of 
evidence, police, judge, jury, and even court reporters are all 
induced to arrive at one conclusion in favor of the new drug. 
But no issue could possibly affect our lives and health more 
than this. Moore and Cohen41 are among many physicians who 
have presented evidence about drugs that were withdrawn only 
after causing many thousands of deaths. It has been estimated by 
Graham that tens of thousands of Americans have died as a 
consequence of taking Vioxx. 
Can we really afford to continue this broken model, 
pretending that patients can make informed choices when neither 
their physicians, nor the editors who vetted the trial reports, can 
access relevant evidence, or trust what evidence they can find? 
I find none of this surprising. Drug companies behave as if 
run by marketers, and nothing the pharmaceutical industry does 
is more scientific than its marketing. The industry has 
established, by the application of vast amounts of money, a 
paradise for themselves on earth. Under the shaky (and 
unaudited) pretext that it costs at least $800 million to put a new 
drug on the market,42 the industry has its way with the 
Congress, researchers, the FDA, physicians and the public. 
 
40 B.M. Psaty & D. Rennie, Stopping Medical Research to Save Money: 
A Broken Pact with Researchers and Patients, 289 JAMA 2128, 2131 (2003). 
41 T.J. MOORE, PRESCRIPTION FOR DISASTER (Simon & Schuster 1998); 
J.S. COHEN, OVERDOSE: THE CASE AGAINST THE DRUG COMPANIES 
(Tarcher/Putnam 2001). 
42 New Study Expected to Significantly Overstate Drug Industry R&D 
Costs, CITIZEN, Nov. 28, 2001,available at http://www.citizen.org/ 
pressroom/print_release.cfm?ID=942 (last visited Dec 5, 2003); J. Love, 
Reporting $802: Opportunity Cost of Capital as a Drug Development Cost. 
IP-HEALTH, Dec. 1, 2001, available at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-
health/2001-December/002486.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2003); U.S. 
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D: Costs, 
Risks, and Rewards, OTA-H-522, Appendix D; Congressional Access to 
Proprietary Pharmaceutical Industry Data, Feb. 1993, 
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgibin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk1/1993/9336/933
616.PDF (last visited Dec 5, 2003). 
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X. SO WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO SALVAGE OUR FDA? 
 
The FDA was set up to regulate drugs because of a popular 
belief that the safety and effectiveness of drugs was too 
important to be left to those who sold those drugs. Over the past 
two decades, we have seen steady erosion in the FDA’s power 
and a transfer of that power to the drug companies. More 
importantly, together with increasing politicization of the 
agency, there has been conspicuous erosion in the FDA’s 
willingness to exercise what powers it does possess to force 
compliance by the drug manufacturers with the law. 
1. We should reaffirm our decision that we want drug 
regulation, and the first essential is to give the FDA strong, 
stable leadership. The lengthy succession of short-term acting 
commissioners is as much an insult to the American people as is 
the fact that the last such acting commissioner has recently pled 
guilty to a criminal indictment concerning financial conflicts of 
interest. Given that the pervasiveness of such conflicts has 
become the principal problem with the whole system, this is 
particularly shameful and emphasizes that strong ethical 
leadership is essential. 
The first order of business for the new commissioner should 
be to restore morale, and ensure that the agency enforces the 
law. 
2. User fees must end. They are profoundly corrupting and 
tilt the balance strongly for the manufacturers and against the 
public health. It is ludicrous to imagine that the FDA could truly 
work for the public if they continue to be paid not to. 
3. Post-marketing surveillance. The Institute of Medicine and 
a good many individuals have drawn attention to the woeful state 
of post marketing surveillance.43 I shall not repeat all their 
43 Institute of Medicine, Committee on the Assessment of the US Drug 
Safety System, Promoting and Protecting the Health of the Public (Baciu A, 
Stratton K, Burke SP, eds., National Academies Press, 2006);B.M. Psaty & 
S.P. Burke, Protecting the Health of the Public—Institute of Medicine 
Recommendations on Drug Safety, 355 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1753, 1755 (2006). 
See also G.D. Curfman, S. Morrissey & J.M. Drazen, Blueprint for a 
stronger Food and drug Administration, 355 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1821 (2006). 
RENNIE MACRO.DOC 7/1/2007  10:46 PM 
1010 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
points, but concentrate on those that I have been pushing for 
several years. 
First, at least as many resources must be devoted to 
surveillance as to pre-marketing approval. Second, surveillance 
must be given a separate department, of equal status to the 
approval arm of the FDA, and taken out of the hands of the 
same people who approved the drug, all of whom have a built-in 
conflict in finding problems with a drug they have just 
approved. Third, at present, our surveillance systems identify 
perhaps 1 percent of such harms due to drugs. I believe that all 
drugs must be approved for a specific probationary period, say 
two years, and during that time, every patient taking the new 
drugs must be entered into a database so that for the very first 
time we begin to get reliable incidence rates for drug reactions 
and other harms. The onus must be placed on the manufacturer 
to prove that the drug should then receive full approval. Fourth, 
if the post marketing studies demanded as a condition of 
approval are not performed in a timely fashion, the FDA must 
promptly withdraw the drug. 
4. It makes no sense for the pharmaceutical companies to be 
the only ones developing the evidence. At present, those who 
have most to gain by finding positive results in clinical trials are 
often the only source of information about their drugs. We must 
separate the development of molecular entities from their later 
clinical trial in humans. I am enthusiastic about venture capital 
flowing to researchers and their institutions when they make new 
discoveries and develop promising new therapies. I am 
completely against the testing of these entities, the new drugs, 
being under the control of the makers, not simply because of 
failures and distortions of reporting, but because it is unethical 
to treat results of experiments done on patients as trade secrets. 
To deal with this fundamental problem, we must set up a 
separate agency—an entirely federally-funded National Institute 
of Clinical Trials, separate in budget from the NIH. This 
institute would decide the trial agenda, and contract out the work 
to institutions. Clinical scientists engaging in these trials would 
receive all the funds through their institutions and not be allowed 
to receive other funds. The results would carry great credibility 
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and, because they would be trials directed to answer clinically 
relevant questions, would be published fast by good journals. 
Medicare and managed care organizations would see a great 
advantage in having an agenda that pays more attention to the 
needs of patients than to the potential profits of the 
manufacturers. For the first time, they would get unbiased 
results and be able to conduct credible cost-effectiveness 
studies.44 Others have proposed variants of this idea.45
Drug companies would be allowed to conduct trials of their 
drugs, as at present, and to register and publish them. However, 
they will find that the public is prepared to give them less 
credibility and good journals will be leery of publishing them. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the past thirty years, we have come to realize that the 
scientific record may be fabricated and in other ways fraudulent. 
But having set up systems to deal with research misconduct, we 
are now discovering a vastly more important problem: the 
massive bias and distortion of the published evidence by 
researchers and their sponsors, both influenced by money. 
All of us will benefit from systems that remove clinical 
testing from the hands of those with profound self-interest in the 
results, and all will benefit from a stronger, less political, FDA, 
entirely freed from pharmaceutical user-fee money. 
The pharmaceutical companies, by their arrogant behavior 
and their naked disregard for the well-being of the public, have 
lost our trust. The FDA, by spinelessly knuckling under to every 
44 S.R. Tunis, D.B. Stryer & C.M. Clancy, Practical Clinical Trials. 
Increasing the Value of Clinical Research for Decision Making in Clinical 
and Health Policy, 290 JAMA 1624, 1624-32 (2003); J.P. Kassirer & 
M.Angell, The Journal’s Policy on Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 331 N. 
ENGL. J. MED. 669, 670 (1994); S. Hill, D. Henry & A. Mitchell, Problems 
in Pharmacoeconomic Analyses, 284 JAMA 1923, 1923-24 (2000); D. 
Rennie & H.S. Luft, Pharmacoeconomic Analyses: Making them 
Transparent, Making them Credible, 283 JAMA 2158, 2158-60 (2000). 
45 A.J.J. Wood, C.M. Stein & R. Woosley, Making Medicines Safer—
The Need for an Independent Drug Safety Board, 339 N. ENGL. J. MED. 
1851, 1851-54 (1998). 
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whim of the drug companies, has thrown away its high 
reputation, and in so doing, also forfeited our trust. For both, 
winning this trust back will be a long and painful business. But 
all of us have too much at stake for them not to succeed. 
